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Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00527R000100190010-6

USIB-EE-5.2/43

5.3/43

11 May 1959

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NSA
Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

ELINT COMMITTEE OF USIB

AGENDA FOR

Fifteenth Meeting to be held at 1000 on Thursday,
21 May 1959, in the Director's Conference Room
Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency

Colonel Charles P. Richman, USAF, Chairman

<u>Subject Number</u>	<u>Agenda Items</u>	<u>Submitted by</u>
EE-5.2/ 5.3/	1. Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting.	Secretariat
EE-4./12	2. DCID No. 6/10. Consideration of its adaptability as a directive on ELINT liaison.	Exec. Secy.
EE-4./11	3. Sub-Committee Structure of the ELINT Committee. Continued from 10th Meeting.	Chairman
EE-9.4/21 9.3/	4. ELINT Matters for Further Attention by the ELINT Committee. Progress report on the study being prepared by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee.	Chairman
EE-29./	5. [REDACTED] Progress report on the policy statement being prepared by the CIA and NSA members.	Navy
EE-33.1	6. [REDACTED] Report of action on implementing COMINT and ELINT Committees recommendation.	Exec. Secy.

25X3

NSA

25X1X7

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3

Chas. M. Townsend
CHAS. M. TOWNSEND
Colonel, USAF
Executive Secretary

USIB-EE-5.2/43

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MINUTES OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING OF THE USIB ELINT COMMITTEE
Held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building, CIA

Colonel Charles P. Richman, USAF, Chairman

PRESENT:

DEFENSE:

Dr. John P. Gigrich
(for Mr. Donald A. Borrmann)

STATE:

Mr. Robert F. Packard

NSA:

[REDACTED]

FOIAb3c

CIA:

[REDACTED]

25X1A9a

NSA

ARMY:

Mr. Grady C. Frank

NAVY:

Lt. Commander Harry B. Pitcher
(for Captain William M. Stevens)

AIR FORCE:

Colonel William F. Scott

JOINT STAFF:

Major William R. Culmer, USA
(for Colonel George E. Perry, USAF)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY:

Colonel Chas. M. Townsend, USAF

ALSO PRESENT:

TECHNICAL ASSISTANT:

Mr. Philip G. Merta

NSA:

[REDACTED]

FOIAb3c

CIA:

[REDACTED]

25X1A9a

NSA

ARMY:

Mr. Richard Battey

AIR FORCE:

Lt. Colonel Louis J. Anderson

SECRETARIAT:

Lt. Colonel Arthur H. Baker, Jr., USAF
Major Alva H. May, USAF

[REDACTED]

25X1A9a

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SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-~~5.2/44~~ ^{5.3/44}

Item 1 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: Approval of the Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting.

PROBLEM:

To approve the Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the ELINT Committee which had been submitted to the Members.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

The Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting were unanimously approved.

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

USIB-EE-~~5.2/44~~ ^{5.3/44}

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-29./19 Item 2 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the
ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: Proposed DCID No. 6/10, Conduct of Liaison with
Collaborating Countries.

PROBLEM:

To consider the advisability of including ELINT liaison in proposed draft DCID 6/10 which was referred to the Committee by the COMINT Committee.

DISCUSSION:

The Members considered the draft directive on COMINT liaison which had been approved by the COMINT Committee and referred to the ELINT Committee for consideration of its adaptability for the inclusion of ELINT liaison matters.

The NSA Member advised that he had prepared several changes to the draft directive, incorporating ELINT, and changing COMINT to SIGINT throughout the document where applicable. He felt that the SUSLO charter should include ELINT aspects.

Some members considered that a DCID for ELINT liaison might not be required. There was considerable discussion on this point. It was recognized that it would be difficult to absorb the proposed NSA changes around the table. It was suggested that the NSA Member draw up a new draft of the directive, incorporating his proposed changes, for circulation to the Members by the next meeting. This course of action was finally agreed on.

The matter of security classification and handling problems concerned with such a COMINT/ELINT document was discussed, but no firm decision was reached on the matter.

The Chairman voiced the opinion that two problems were involved; first, the need for an implementing directive on NSA procedures with respect to Paragraph 8a of NSCID 6, and secondly, a reply to the COMINT Committee on ELINT aspects for the directive. It was noted that there was no great urgency in advising the COMINT Committee of action, and resolution of the need for the proposed directive was deferred for later consideration after review of a new NSA draft.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

To defer further action on the matter until the next regular meeting; NSA meantime to circulate a new draft for consideration.

SECRET

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

ITEM 2 (Cont'd)

USIB-EE-29./19

ACTION FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

NSA - Circulate new draft DCID 6/10 as noted above.

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

USIB-EE-29./19

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-4./14 Item 3 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the
ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: Subcommittee Structure of the ELINT Committee.

PROBLEM:

To consider subcommittee structure requirements for the ELINT Committee;
specifically to determine whether to continue SEAG as now constituted.

DISCUSSION:

Consideration of this problem has devolved into a question of the future
of the Special ELINT Advisory Group (SEAG).

The NSA Member considered that the problem was one of supplementary
guidance and, as such, the function could be performed under NSA jurisdiction.
As ELINT requirements funnel through NSA, the Agency can provide the advice
formerly the responsibility of SEAG. He considered that there was no further
need for SEAG as presently constituted.

The Air Force Member stated that the reasons for the establishment of
SEAG no longer exist, and recommended that the Group be discontinued.

The Chairman considered that it was the consensus of the Committee that
the function performed by SEAG is still necessary and desirable, and it was
a question of where that function was to be performed.

The CIA Member recommended that those members interested in the problem
should review the history of SEAG and note that it was set up to consider
sensitive ELINT operations only and determine whether it falls under NSCID 5
or NSCID 6. He further recommended that the interested members should submit
their views for Committee consideration, and that resolution be deferred to
the next meeting. This recommendation was adopted.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

To defer resolution to the next regular meeting, meantime interested
Members to submit papers for consideration outlining their views.

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

USIB-EE-4./14

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-~~9.1/6~~ 9.9/6 Item 4 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: ELINT Matters for Further Consideration by the ELINT Committee.

PROBLEM:

To review progress of the ad hoc working group charged with preparing a study on [REDACTED] matters.

DISCUSSION:

The Technical Assistant circulated copies of the minutes of the third meeting of the ad hoc committee. He noted that the group was approaching the problem on the basis of determining what [REDACTED] can do to assist in the accomplishment of National Intelligence Objectives. Starting with an analysis of PNIO's, the group has been applying [REDACTED] collection techniques to those intelligence problems that appear to be subject to this unique collection capability. The problems outlined in the circulated paper were those contributed by GMAIC. Similar contributions by JAEIC and SIC are expected, but have not yet been submitted.

The Technical Assistant noted that his report was incomplete at this time because of the difficulties inherent in gathering all the required material. His remarks were in the nature of a progress report and he advised that the subcommittee will make appropriate recommendations when the groundwork has been fully laid.

The Navy Member noted that many ELINT airborne platforms might be adaptable for [REDACTED] and requested the ad hoc group to give this matter due consideration. The Air Force Member also touched on the matter of [REDACTED] and asked that this subject also be considered.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

To note the progress report of the Technical Assistant on the [REDACTED] ad hoc subcommittee; the group to continue its study for further consideration at a subsequent meeting.

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-29./20 Item 5 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: Draft DCID on Release of U. S. ELINT to [REDACTED]

25X9
NSA

PROBLEM:

To review the draft DCID on "Release of U. S. ELINT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which had been submitted to the Committee for consideration.

25X9
NSA

DISCUSSION:

The NSA Member spoke on the draft DCID submitted by the ad hoc group composed of the CIA and NSA Members. He felt that further guidance by the Committee was needed. He also circulated a revised NSA draft for consideration.

There was considerable discussion on the need for such a directive and the scope of the policies and procedures to be covered. There was some feeling that release matters were tied in with liaison, and that it was difficult to determine where these overlap. Also, the role of SD-MICC was not clear, and in some cases the distinctions between ELINT and electronic warfare.

The Chairman voiced the view that such a directive should clarify the position of USIB, in view of the Board's responsibility for ELINT security.

The NSA Member noted that considerable confusion existed on the subject in the community, and considered that guidance was needed to outline permissible actions as well as clear mechanisms for accomplishing these actions.

The Army Member stated that SD-MICC should be notified that ELINT is outside of their jurisdiction, and point out the differences between ELINT and electronic warfare activities.

The Chairman felt that USIB had been given a responsibility, and that the Committee must clarify that responsibility. He felt that a general guidance document should not only outline the permissive aspects of release, but also the advisability of such release. He recommended that the Members give further consideration to the draft submitted by the ad hoc group as well as the revised version which was circulated by the NSA Member. He asked that any further changes recommended be submitted to the Executive Secretary for circulation in time for consideration at the next meeting. The Members concurred.

USIB-EE-29./20

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SECRET

SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

ITEM 5 (Cont'd)

USIB-EE-29./20

At the request of the NSA Member, a transcription of the discussion on this item is attached as an annex to this minute.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

To defer resolution until the next regular meeting, at which time the Committee will consider the draft directive submitted with USIB-EE-29./17 as well as the revised NSA draft, plus any additional contributions submitted by interested Members.

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

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SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SUBJECT NUMBER

USIB-EE-33.1/8 Item 6 on the Agenda for the Fifteenth Meeting of the
ELINT Committee, held on 21 May 1959.

Subject: Intelligence Estimate of [REDACTED] Communications/
Electronics .

25X3

NSA

PROBLEM:

To note report of action on implementation of the COMINT/ELINT
Committees recommendation for preparation of a national estimate on
[REDACTED] communications/electronics devices and systems.

25X3

NSA

DISCUSSION:

The Chairman and the Executive Secretary reported on progress to
date in this matter. A request for the estimate has been submitted to
the Assistant Director for National Estimates (USIB-EE-33.1/7). This
follows normal procedures in such cases, and no further Committee action
is required at this time.

DECISION: (21 May 1959)

To note the action taken on implementing preparation of intelligence
estimate on [REDACTED] communications/electronics capabilities.

25X3

NSA

ACTION FOR U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

Note for information.

USIB-EE-33.1/8

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET - U. S. EYES ONLY

SECRETARY'S NOTES:

1. The Fifteenth Meeting, 21 May 1959, came to order at 1000.
2. The Executive Secretary introduced Major Alva H. May who is joining the Secretariat. He is to replace Lt. Colonel Arthur H. Baker, Jr., who is leaving for his new assignment at the end of this month.
3. In discussing the most desirable time for holding Committee meetings, the members decided to schedule future meetings in the mornings. They will be held on the third Thursday of each month at 1000 unless otherwise specified.

The next meeting will be held on Thursday, 11 June 1959, at 1000 hours in the Director's Conference Room.
4. The meeting adjourned at 1310.

SECRET

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DRAFT DCID ON [REDACTED]

25X9
NSA

ANNEX TO ITEM 5, FIFTEENTH ELINT MEETING

COL. RICHMAN: There was a report submitted by [REDACTED] on behalf of CIA and NSA.

FOIAb3c
NSA

[REDACTED] This paper is submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee members as an agreement by the drafters that these are the ideas of the Committee, which were kicked around at great length. We would like to have these ideas before the Committee for further deliberation. I think I speak honestly in saying either CIA or NSA could have alone drafted a more coherent and consistent paper. This concludes my remarks as an Ad Hoc Committee member. Representing NSA I will have some other things to say.

FOIAb3c
NSA

COL. RICHMAN: Any other comments?

COL. SCOTT: Is the paper really necessary? The question is this, by [REDACTED] do we mean tapes and data or do we mean to say that if this is under the auspices of NSA or CIA they could not get tapes or anything like that on their own? If we consider a document that merely used ELINT and [REDACTED] as COMINT might be, is it necessary to get this involved?

25X9
NSA

25X9
NSA

COL. RICHMAN: There seems to be a necessity for some sort of policy or even more, some agreed or established procedure or mechanism for handling [REDACTED] We went through a previous discussion whether or not this fell in the SD-MICC area or Board area and it was determined it was in the Board. No policy had been promulgated by USIB as a result of its deliberations, and no interpretation of various [REDACTED] There had been no procedure which would insure that there was any continuity or consistency of information by any Agency in the United States. This is the reason for considering this.

25X1X7
NSA

25X1X7
NSA

FOIAb3c
NSA

[REDACTED] The Air Force Member has said, in effect, "That government governs best which governs least." In NSA we feel the community benefits by knowing what the rules are. We hold that in 6/10 and here. We can point to a certain contingency in the past and we can anticipate a certain amount in the future. We think some such paper would serve to dispel a great amount of confusion.

DR. GIGRICH: Your statement that we had decided that SD-MICC had no relationship with this problem at all - did we reach that decision? I am not certain on the relationships.

SECRET

SECRET

FOIAb3c

SECRET

NSA

[REDACTED] The JCS Member asked us to look into this. We have a view which we can't document because the Board has never really tangled with this on ELINT insofar as our records show. We feel that the Board is the governing authority, and that whereas we might have to refer to SD-MICC, it would be in the area of release of equipment.

DR. GIGRICH: I raise the question because the only exceptions I am aware of are special negotiations - precisely COMSEC. COMINT is written in other pages. Since ELINT is the responsibility of the Board, the Board has never been too much concerned in this.

COL. RICHMAN: The answer is no. Various people can do various things [REDACTED] but under implied approval of the Board the matter can not be documented either in SD-MICC or the Board.

25X9

NSA

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Isn't the NSCID awfully flat?

COL. RICHMAN: There is a memorandum from General Counsel, DOD, that is very specific in the field of ELINT security.

DR. GIGRICH: General Counsel ruled only on COMINT not ELINT.

COL. RICHMAN: He ruled on both. He did go back to state that the responsibility for security of ELINT information was that of the Board and not NSA. The responsibility for security of ELINT information which appears in NSCID 6 implies the necessity for developing an appropriate policy to permit or to cover the release from U.S. constantly. Following that it is an appropriate matter on which the Board should legislate. We do have the responsibility or we will accept the rules and regulations that some other body lays down.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Maybe the real issue here is the very flat language of the NSCID that all ELINT equipment is pretty clearly an intelligence thing. So little intelligence and so much military operations might seem to some people to call for the other.

DR. GIGRICH: Especially related to ECM etc. Is the Board going to get involved in this thing too?

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] In the Ad Hoc Committee this was discussed. I think you will find a paragraph where we addressed ourselves specifically to security.

FOIAb3c

NSA

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] First in 'Purpose'.

[REDACTED] Paragraph 3d second sentence, It was our attempt to get close to the nub of security of ELINT.

SECRET

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SECRET

MR. PACKARD: Insofar as it relates to COMINT.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] That is correct - a little bit more than that, it takes the point of issue raised in NSCID 6 vis-a-vis which may be developed by the Board - this addresses itself to that issue and reaches a little bit beyond.

MR. PACKARD: No inherent security considerations.

COL. RICHMAN: This definitely does not come under policy even though the same pieces of equipment may be involved.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Would you then say that SD-MICC rules and regulations would be applicable?

COL. RICHMAN: In the case of Electronic Warfare?

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Yes.

COL. RICHMAN: Yes.

MR. FRANK: Notify SD-MICC and get agreement from them that ELINT activities are excluded from their responsibilities, as we did in the past.

COL. RICHMAN: I think this is necessary. We do have that vague ambiguity there.

MR. FRANK: Bring up the differences between ELINT activities and Electronic Warfare. I don't believe SD-MICC is aware of those things.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I think the Chairman's remark is the only possible interpretation that it should be made official.

CDR. PITCHER: It's the same when it comes to the intercept and analysis stage.

LT. COL. ANDERSON: What are you going to do when the two people disagree?

COL. RICHMAN: I doubt there would be cases that would go there. The same people by and large are represented in SD-MICC for intelligence. We are getting away from ELINT into something else awaiting generally the security considerations. SD-MICC has always granted an exception to the intelligence chiefs in providing a particular bit of information. The determining factor is the people and intelligence chiefs of the three services, and of State.

LT. COL. ANDERSON: What you are saying there is the existing specific channel for equipment classification.

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COL. RICHMAN: Unfortunately the Board was given a responsibility in this. Dependent upon definition. Clarify what USIB's responsibilities are.

25X1A9a MR. FRANK: Equipment plays a big part in quid pro quo arrangements.

Would it help if I read two sentences of the NSCID - Paragraph 4d under USIB functions (read).

COL. RICHMAN: Recommend to the Board what this Committee feels the Board should do. It can say what it wants - we will have no part in handling this or we will handle it in such and such a fashion.

25X3 DR. GIGRICH: Under present ground rules anything ELINT would always include

NSA COL. SCOTT: Mr. Chairman, this entire problem is going to become more complicated in the future than it is today. When we get ourselves tied down - we might be better off to say what is intelligence and what is operations. But we today we are finding it more difficult to define the two. It is different today than it was in World War II.

25X1A9a I think the sentence that has been read is the wrong sentence. It applies to ELINT activities but does not include necessarily this equipment. The statement I think covers it is in Paragraph 8 which deals with COMINT/ELINT. I feel this is the one that gives the Board the right to clarify a matter of this sort. It is clearly intended to be sweeping. Board statement of policy could make any decision necessary.

25X9
NSA

25X1A9a We discussed this at the ad hoc committee level and considered that the charge given to the ad hoc committee was not to develop rules and regulations but rather to deal with the release question.

25X1A9a It is part of it.

We tried to restrict ourselves to the release question.

COL. RICHMAN: I think both quoted versions are applicable here. Certainly security is involved if you are releasing information. Certainly they meant the Board had responsibility. Bill, I am going to over-rule you to this extent - there seems to be some sort of feeling here that some sort of policy is necessary. Ben, do you want to address yourself to the problem.

25X1X7
& NSA
25X9

FOIAb3c NSA We would make some changes here and there and although they would not greatly change the intent of what the ad hoc committee intended to do, the word changes are extensive enough. I have undertaken to prepare another draft which I would like to table at this time, saving only the title.

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SECRET

MR. FRANK: In view of this development could we have the paper distributed and go home and have a look at them?

COL. RICHMAN: I would hope that we could work at this and provide more guidance with respect to where we are going in this area. We will not get along very far if we do that.

DR. GIGRICH: We could meet in two weeks. We are not restricted to a monthly meeting.

COL. RICHMAN: I would like to get this solved.

25X1A [REDACTED] Perhaps Ben could tell us the nature of the changes.

FOIAb3c [REDACTED] Change the Purpose as stated in the draft forwarded by
NSA the Secretariat which now says (read). I would change this to include
ELINT itself. It is a little more exclusive regarding training material
and instruction materials. Objectives I don't believe are greatly changed.
Where we had read conditions we now read "policy". Since we were somewhat
distressed by the original version and at second glance we make it a
requirement that release be consistent with USIB policies.

COL. SCOTT: On Mr. Price's paper first page, second line US Signals
Intelligence --

FOIAb3c [REDACTED] Would it help you if we substituted SIGINT?
NSA

[REDACTED] It also permits a situation wherein ELINT might be used
in a package arrangement where COMINT and ELINT are concerned.

COL. SCOTT: Signals undoubtedly has one meaning to you.

FOIAb3c [REDACTED] Only as defined before.
NSA 25X1A9a

[REDACTED] I don't want to get into the interests of MAAG.

FOIAb3c [REDACTED] USIB is a little too broad. What the Board proposes to
NSA do is the Board's business, but that is not what we wanted.
25X1A9a

[REDACTED] We would prefer that use of USIB COMINT shall not
be used for other than COMINT purposes.

COL. SCOTT: In Services we have Signals Branches so Signals means
other than what [REDACTED] said.

25X1A [REDACTED] If CIA wishes to introduce larger frame of reference,
FOIAb3c then we would again have contact in some way with COMINT/ELINT relation-
NSA ship in the body.

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SECRET

SECRET

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Consider we have interpreted it in a broader sense.

FOIAb3c

NSA

[REDACTED] In paragraph 3 we have made this policy -- we have suggested that such collaboration as exists is recorded. The fact of collaboration is recorded in USIB document 29./11.

COL. RICHMAN: I would hope that perusal of this paper may help resolve points of conflict before the next meeting.

DR. GIGRICH: I have one big problem and still have no answer. I don't know the reason for Navy's original concern. I myself still don't understand why ELINT can't be handled under general Board policy for the release of intelligence information.

COL. RICHMAN: What is that policy?

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] If there are other factors considered, I wonder if your point would not be covered by eliminating "signals"?

DR. GIGRICH: In other words maybe we don't need a paper.

COL. RICHMAN: What procedure has the Board adopted in handling specific questions?

25X1A9a

25X1X7

[REDACTED] You need a specific paper. There has been constant

25X1X7

& NSA 25X9

FOIAb3c

DR. GIGRICH: That is a question of liaison. If you look at [REDACTED] paper it is really concerned with liaison, not with release. I wonder if it isn't liaison?

NSA

COL. RICHMAN: Not solely.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]: Then isn't there a need for some channel of general guidance as to what you can do under that liaison.

25X1X7

& NSA 25X9

COL. RICHMAN: We would still need a piece of paper. Doesn't say [REDACTED] but does provide within the [REDACTED] mechanism of a procedure so that there is a general policy which does good regardless of how it goes.

DR. GIGRICH: If the Board has not seen fit to be alarmed about it and if we generally think ELINT follows in that line --

FOIAb3c

NSA

[REDACTED] There is at least one member that is concerned.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] There was concern on the part of the Director and his Deputy.

SECRET

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SECRET

MR. PACKARD: Can anyone cite a current perplexing problem in the ELINT field?

25X1X7 & NSA
25X9

25X1A9a

Tuesday the Board approved the activities in [REDACTED] and referred the matter to the COMINT/ELINT Committees.

25X1A9a

Paragraph 3a is restrictive -- NSA paper.

COL. RICHMAN: It was an attempt to specify what is Board policy. Paragraph c at the end was intended to take care of any cases.

FOIAb3c

NSA

[REDACTED] Could not CIA seek Board approval?

COL. RICHMAN: One comment - in this release problem, material is not generally collected by counterpart activities - ELINT material and generally speaking a release sought by Army, Navy or Air Force to a particular activity with whom they are in collaboration. There is a necessity for some means of effecting coordination. Further because information will be passed because we have a situation in which we have various US activities engaged in one or several elements it is essential that there be a certain amount of consistency so that we don't find ourselves in the rather absurd position of one Service played against the other.

DR. GIGRICH: What you say about ELINT is true about intelligence in general.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Covert relationships do come into #5.

COL. RICHMAN: The purpose of this is to see whether or not the Board wants to take any action on it. The NSA position has been NSA thinks they are not adequate and there seems to be a problem.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] Ad Hoc Committee report paragraph 5b addresses it to your question.

FOIAb3c

NSA

[REDACTED] Have essentially this in our 4b except that we spell out CIA.

MR. FRANK: In Ad Hoc paper paragraphs 4 and 5 when you speak of executive agent do you mean CIA or NSA?

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] The interpretation in NSCID 6 places this responsibility, except for [REDACTED] on the DCI, but delegation is permissive in the spirit of the NSCID.

25X1X7
& NSA 25X9

FOIAb3c

NSA

[REDACTED] We felt in our rewrite this was true since this was the case. There would be confusion if it was either NSA or CIA as executive agent or such other delegation as they might wish to make.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

25X1X7 & NSA 25X9

COL. SCOTT: NSA has stated there is some confusion. There is no doubt in my mind in any arrangements with the [REDACTED] there are two agencies involved, CIA and NSA, as appropriate. You don't do anything pertaining to COMINT and/or ELINT without calling it to the attention of these two groups.

[REDACTED] We find it useful to spell things out perhaps because minor things arise from time to time which indicate that NSA gets in a little late in their notification. If it were clearly understood and spelled out by some special document such as this, the community would profit.

DR. GIGRICH: Then it is clearly a liaison problem and not a question of release.

[REDACTED] The question is also one of release. We must bring NSA in on something which is about to be released. NSA is charged with giving technical advice.

MR. PACKARD: It strikes me from looking at the jointly prepared paper by CIA and NSA that there are not really any substantive limitations on the type of ELINT or the purposes for which it can be used. This leads me to feel that what is needed here is not a paper that would characterize materials but describe the controls.

[REDACTED] We ought to go back to the statement made by the Department of State Member on ELINT - why don't we consider what ELINT is releasable and what is not, then spell out why it is not. This is what we have essentially stated. Then in our objective we have limited it to SIGINT. In both we say ELINT may be released provided you meet the following criteria - put in a set of checks and balances.

COL. RICHMAN: There are no great substantive changes except there is a policy stated which is a very simple sort of thing - now ELINT is releasable. Pronouncement by the Board that it does have a role in this. This would permit clarification vis-a-vis state SD-MICC. Second position and basic contribution is in the procedural aspects to include what, to whom, and why. There is very little except a broad statement of policy with the basic paper being procedural.

MR. PACKARD: Really this paper doesn't say those things.

[REDACTED] Under coordination section 5 you do have these things.

MR. PACKARD: I agree - precisely.

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COL. SCOTT: I would like to suggest that NSA and CIA adopt a policy for their own internal use. Insofar as I am concerned we immediately go to CIA and NSA as appropriate and get their advice and guidance. Give all things of interest to NSA and CIA.

COL. RICHMAN: I hate to be legalistic in this area again. In reading the responsibilities of this Deckart report it seemed to be very specific that the Board itself is the Board which has these responsibilities; therefore CIA and NSA without Board approval should not legislate or set up procedures. There may be a fine line of distinction. It is a question of whether pronouncement includes the procedural aspects. It is desirable that procedures be established. It is not within NSA's responsibility but it is clearly a Board responsibility. If those of you who have not seen a copy of that memorandum will let me know, I can make some available because it is fairly clear.

FOIAb3c
NSA [REDACTED] Vehicle for just getting on the strong rules and regulations which cut across the community structure are rather formidable. It is very useful if we could have a DCID or something like it. What is something like it?

COL. RICHMAN: This would differentiate this [REDACTED] Promulgate procedures for information without going to the Board. In this case it seems to me that this fine line of distinction indicates that it is preferable - almost mandatory.

25X9

NSA

MR. PACKARD: I think you've hit it on the nose. The essential action the Board can take in establishing release is to assign the responsibility to review coordinated releases.

MR. MERTA: This is a broad paper. Couldn't we have an appendix defining for one thing Board policies and a second part that ELINT which can be released in our daily work in summary portion phased with what part. How much can we let them know about our R&D, how much ROB, how much targets and objectives can we release? There are specific requirements on all of the broader requirements. Things can be delegated in an appendix.

25X1A9a

MR. [REDACTED] I would feel that this cuts clean across so many already promulgated mechanisms and procedures. We are stretching ELINT right through the intelligence community. [REDACTED] we have a procedure.

25X1X7

25X1X7

& NSA 25X9

MR. MERTA: There are no separate regulations for releasing ELINT in its various forms. The [REDACTED] are quite interested.

& NSA
25X9

FOIAb3c
NSA [REDACTED] This paper we proposed to put out is the ELINT paper on Board policy. It does specify in general the kind of things we would give. (read) With this as a basis, CIA or anyone involved in this could come to NSA for technical advice regarding release - they would get it and have no further reference to structure. What need there is for an annex, I fail

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to see. The fact of collaboration or suitability of recipient would have to be determined. We would consider CIA except where it is NSA who actually makes the delivery.

COL. RICHMAN: I would be opposed to a detailed annex. I would take a specific example. At the last SEAG meeting where we discussed what we would like [REDACTED] to do, among them was some [REDACTED]. They were not assigned the capability for this, not because it was not of interest to them, but primarily because we, the United States, had better and other places where we could develop this information. Why levy this chore on this country? These are things one has to take into account. We are limiting ourselves considerably beyond that which the policy permits on a case by case basis.

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NSA

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25X1A9a
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NSA

[REDACTED]: We have felt particularly strong on that. We all have budgetary limitations. If we knew it would be particularly desirable on the part of the [REDACTED] to get in that area to do something else we would have to go ahead let them do it. We didn't issue equipment to them for that. To accomplish this in a drafting sense without considering each country would be a very difficult job if not practically impossible. Each Member of the Board had recourse to the Board effecting each country involved. He could have set forth his views. In the absence of these things it would be impossible to prepare in detail more than a general delineation of responsibilities.

25X1A9a

25X1X7

[REDACTED]: Aren't there times when you would get into the clandestine area?

25X1A9a

25X1X7

[REDACTED]: I thought there were three areas.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]: It was the objective section that troubled me.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]: 3b (read) - that is plenty loose. It wasn't meant to be exclusive.

COL. RICHMAN: We have a paper before the Committee - can we consider this paper subsequently at the next meeting with changes individual members might want to bring in. In order to get on with it I would think that since it is patent that this paper will be rewritten in some form, those who desire to make changes circulate these changes to the Secretariat prior to the next meeting. I would like to consider this substantively at the next meeting, in line with the changes which the individual members bring in.

MR. PACKARD: Who is going to rewrite it?

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COL. RICHMAN: There has been one rewrite. There seemed to be complications between agencies with regard to certain arrangements so his rewrite will not use this as the basic paper with changes as submitted by individual members. How long would it take to get yours revamped?

FOIAb3c

[REDACTED] I have heard nothing which suggests or says that our paper is deficient. I would like to table this draft through the Executive Secretary for consideration and we could have this in their hands by Tuesday or Wednesday. Then I would like to have Members come in with substantive wording where necessary. We do spell out CIA and NSA. Executive Agent is implicit.

NSA

COL. RICHMAN: We have a paper which NSA proposes to modify. Modification will be circulated. With that in mind if there are other modifications either to the basic paper or NSA proposed modifications, will Members provide the Secretary with their versions. Address yourselves to the changes which NSA is submitting.

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[REDACTED] Would there be no merit in getting the ad hoc committee back together?

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[REDACTED] I think we have gone as far as we can. If this does not help Department of State or Defense, we would advise them to submit changes.

25X1C

MR. FRANK: Army has an urgent problem right now involving a possible service-to-service deal with [REDACTED] I would like Mr. Battey to explain. I think that is a problem on which we would like some guidance.

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& NSA 25X9
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MR. BATTEY: If the Members recall we have a working relationship with [REDACTED] unit which is sitting next to us at [REDACTED] There is a proposal coming up now that we extend this relationship to include the ASA ELINT Unit located at [REDACTED] to work a similar deal with the [REDACTED] ELINT unit located at [REDACTED] My question is the delay which is ensuing on the policy directive going to preclude NSA from approving or starting the approach on this service-to-service arrangement under the terms of their present responsibilities under NSCID No. 6. I don't think there should be.

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& NSA 25X9

25X1X7
& NSA 25X9

FOIAb3c NSA
25X3
NSA

[REDACTED] I thought I had made our position clear on this. I saw a message going to NSA [REDACTED] which said go ahead.

FOIAb3c
NSA

MR. BATTEY: I had not seen it.

[REDACTED] We will take action.

COL. RICHMAN: Similar arrangements have been made vis-a-vis the Security Service through ASA with the [REDACTED]

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MR. BATTEY: Delay on this particular action will not prevent anyone from going ahead.

NSA

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